Explaining higher education progress through risk dominance in an n-person coordination (Stag Hunt) game by Pontes, José Pedro
 
REM WORKING PAPER SERIES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Explaining higher education progress through risk dominance in 
an n-person coordination (Stag Hunt) game 
 
José Pedro Pontes 
 
REM Working Paper 0133-2020 
 
May 2020 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REM – Research in Economics and Mathematics 
Rua Miguel Lúpi 20, 
1249-078 Lisboa, 
Portugal 
 
 
 
 
 
ISSN 2184-108X 
 
Any opinions expressed are those of the authors and not those of REM. Short, up to 
two paragraphs can be cited provided that full credit is given to the authors. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
REM – Research in Economics and Mathematics 
 
Rua Miguel Lupi, 20 
1249-078 LISBOA 
Portugal 
 
Telephone: +351 - 213 925 912 
E-mail: rem@iseg.ulisboa.pt 
 
https://rem.rc.iseg.ulisboa.pt/  
 
 
 
 
https://twitter.com/ResearchRem 
 
https://www.linkedin.com/company/researchrem/ 
 
https://www.facebook.com/researchrem/ 
 
1 
 
Explaining higher education progress 
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Abstract: In this paper, we use HARSANYI and SELTEN (1988)’s risk dominance concept to 
explain the growth in the Portuguese higher education system during two time periods: 1998 -
2005 and 2005-2018. 
During the first time period, the high annual growth rate in tertiary schooling (8.2%) can be 
accounted for by a n – person, k – coordination Stag Hunt game framework. Hence, the 
progress in university education can be described as the outcome of a noncooperative game, 
where youngsters and their families can take decisions without needing to communicate 
previously. 
By contrast, during 2005-2018, the former coordination game seems inadequate to rationalize 
the continued progress in college schooling at an annual rate of 5%, since the wage premium 
of tertiary education fell drastically (more than 20%) during the same interval.  Hence, we 
switch to an “unanimity” game as framework of analysis. Within such a game, the widespread 
tertiary enrolment can be accounted for a diminishing “unanimity” requirement, derived from 
a shrinking demography and the sheer cumulative effect of past spread of college education.  
We apply here NASH (1950, 1953)’s intuition that the selection of an equilibrium point within 
an unanimity game is a tool for modelling the outcome of a game, where the players discuss in 
order to reach an agreement. Hence, we can describe the rise in college education in Portugal 
in the more recent time period as the outcome of a cooperative process, leading to a wide 
policy consensus. 
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Introduction 
 
Since MANKIW, ROMER and WEIL (1992), it is well known that global convergence trends are 
at present both in schooling rates and in per head income, but the former evolution appears to 
be much faster than the latter one. By restricting to Europe and to higher education, PONTES 
and BUHSE (2019) compute speeds of  convergence in schooling rates and of real per head 
GDP with contrasting values, namely 4.0% and 2.3%, respectively.  Hence, economic incentives 
cannot fully account for the differential development of college education across countries. 
The growth rates of tertiary schooling rates and economic growth are still more at odds with 
each other in the case of a medium income European country such as Portugal. In this country 
for the period 1998 – 2005, while the tertiary schooling rate grew at an average yearly rate of 
8.2%, the growth rate in per head real GDP was only 1.2%. The gap between either trend 
continued during the period 2005 -2018, the respective growth rates being 5.0% and 0.7%.2 
It can be objected that the private incentives to complete tertiary education are related with 
the wage premium of college attendance, i.e. the relative difference between the skilled 
labour reward and the unskilled one, rather than with the average income. In terms of such a 
wage advantage, Portugal fared well in comparison to other European countries. MISIKOVA 
and VECERNIK (2019) find a value of 0.374 for the wage premium of college education in 
Portugal during the time period 2004 – 2013, which far exceeds the median (0.183) and the 
first 
1  quantile
3
 (0.211) within a set of 27 European countries. 
However, it is widely acknowledged that the wage advantage yielded by higher education in 
Portugal has been eroding during this time period. The OCDE Employment Outlook 2019 found 
that such a decrease in the wage premium has been quite sharp. Portugal is deemed to be the 
OCDE country where this fall was more sudden and severe, reaching -22.8% for the period 
2006 – 2016., while the average decrease was only 3.3%. This fact matches with the surge in 
the emigration of skilled Portuguese youngsters from 2013 on. 
Nevertheless, during this time period the progress in the tertiary schooling rate in Portugal 
continued at high pace, although private incentives diminished sharply. This paper attempts to 
provide a reasonable explanation for this apparent contradiction. 
Higher education (i.e. ISCED 5-8) is non-compulsory, so that the decision to enrol is an 
individual one. However, several authors have stressed that the accumulation of human capital 
is by its nature a “group process”, on three different grounds. 
Firstly, learning only takes place in groups of people who freely discuss face-to-face during 
extended periods (LUCAS, 1988; MARSHALL, 1949). Hence, local externalities in human capital 
are crucial. BENABOU (1993) finds that the effort cost for a youngster to complete a college 
degree strongly decreases strongly with the share of residents with complete higher education 
living in the same neighbourhood. 
Secondly, to complete higher education leads to the acquisition of specialized skills, which 
become profitable only if each graduate is matched with complementary specialists within the 
 
2 In this paper, all data whose source is not otherwise mentioned were drawn from the Portuguese 
database PORDATA, published by the Fundação Francisco Manuel dos Santos. 
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same geographical area (WYDICK, 2008, DIAMOND, 1982). Hence, tertiary education skills are 
not supposed to be “self-consumed” by the graduate, but rather “traded” in the local labour 
market with complementary graduates. 
Lastly, college students must share a fixed infrastructure (i.e. professors, libraries, labs) in 
order to be able to learn. Hence, the size of students group should meet a minimum 
requirement in order that the teaching institution breaks even.  
In this paper, we will use the framework of a n-person coordination game (a Stag Hunt game) 
in order to rationalize the decision by a group of students to enrol in the university, in spite of 
the fact that private returns to higher education are small and fast decreasing. We will try to 
answer the question: can these decisions be modelled as the equilibrium outcome of a non- 
cooperative game or in alternative, should they be regarded as the result of an explicit 
agreement involving the students and their families? 
The coordination game approach, with multiple Nash equilibria, has already been applied to 
the educational field, namely to the issue of “ child labour”, in order to model the parental 
decision to either send a youngster to school or to assign to work outside the home (see BASU 
and VAN, 1998, and BASU, 1999). 
 
A Stag Hunt game to model decisions to join higher education 
 
Assumptions 
 
We feature an economy along three consecutive time periods. In each period 0,1, 2t   , the 
economy is composed by tn  families. Each family is composed by an adult and by a youngster 
who has the proper age to enrol in the university. 
Let ts  be the share of families in period t  , whose adult holds a college degree. We assume 
that such an adult predetermines his child to enrol in the university. Consequently, in each 
period t  , only 1 1t t tn s n   students are free to decide whether to engage in higher education. 
We presuppose that in period 0, the values of 0 0 and n s  are exogenously determined. Then, in 
each time 1,2t  , each one of the 1 1t t tn s n   students with a low background decides 
whether to enter immediately in the labour market (strategy  ) or to enrol in college 
(strategy   ) , thus postponing one period his participation in the labour market. Such 
decisions are made simultaneously. 
The payoffs of the pure strategies are as follows. If the youngster decides to find a job 
immediately, he obtains the certain payoff Uw , the wage for unskilled labour. Otherwise, if he 
decides to enrol in college, he may obtain one of two rewards.  
If at least k  of the 1 1t t tn s n   students decide to join higher education, then he obtains the 
payoff 
1
Sw
r
 , the discounted value of the wage of unskilled labour, with S Uw w . For 
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simplicity, we will assume that the discount rate 0r  , so that the payoff of higher education 
with k-coordination among candidates is Sw  , the wage of skilled labour. The minimum 
requirement k  stems from the group nature of higher education, whose foundations were 
discussed above in the Introduction. 
Otherwise, if the minimum coordination requirement k  is not satisfied, then the youngster’s 
payoff is zero. 
 
The set of Nash equilibria of the n-person Stag Hunt game 
 
The n-person Stag Hunt game has been well treated in CARLSSON and van DAMME (1993-b) 
and van DAMME (2002). They prove that this game has two strict Nash equilibria, namely   
(all players select pure strategy  ) and   (all players choose the pure strategy  ), which is 
rather intuitive. 
This game involves the selection of a Nash equilibrium, which amounts to the specification for 
each player of beliefs about the opponents’ behaviour thus enabling each player to deal with 
the situation of strategic uncertainty where he finds himself from the start. 
In the experimental economics literature of repeated coordination games (Van HUYCK, 
BATTALIO and BEIL, 1990, 1991; SCHMIDT et Al. 2003), the selection of a Nash equilibrium 
point has used two kind of reasons, namely “inductive” arguments related with historical 
precedents; and “deductive” arguments, which are founded on the mathematical structure of 
the game situation. In this paper, “inductive” considerations are accounted by the fact that the 
number of individuals who decide to enrol in college, t tn s , predetermine the decisions made 
by their children in the subsequent time period 1t  . 
According to KIM (1996), three strands of literature deal with the selection of a Nash 
equilibrium from the “deductive” perspective. HARSANYI and SELTEN (1988) handle this 
problem for static games of complete information by defining the concept of “risk 
dominance”, which we will treat further beyond.  
CARLSONN and van DAMME (1993-a) redefine “risk dominance” for 2 2  games of 
incomplete information, the so called “global games” where the players observe their payoffs 
imperfectly, with a small amount of “noise”. The selection of a Nash equilibrium follows from 
the observation of a sequence of perturbed games, as the amount of “noise” converges to 
zero. The Nash equilibrium that is the limit of this sequence is regarded to be coincident with 
HARSANYI and SELTEN (1988)’s “risk dominance”. CARLSSON and van DAMME (1993-b) extend 
the concept of “global game” to a symmetric Stag Hunt with n players. 
The issue of Nash equilibrium selection can also be dealt with by means of explicitly dynamic 
and evolutionary processes, as in KANDORI, MAILATH and ROB (1995), among others. 
In this paper, we will adopt the HARSANYI and SELTEN (1988)’s “risk dominance” as a 
comparative statics device, which we will use to consider successive time periods 1998-2005 
and 2005-2018, in order to explain reasonably the evolution of higher education in Portugal. 
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How to select a Nash equilibrium in the symmetric n-person Stag Hunt game? 
 
It is well known that HARSANYI and SELTEN (1988) define two criteria for ranking multiple 
Nash equilibria, namely payoff dominance and risk dominance. While the former concept is 
related with collective rationality, the latter expresses the individual attitude of each player 
while dealing with the strategic uncertainty he holds about his opponents’ behaviour. 
In theoretical terms, HARSANYI and SELTEN (1988) contend that, when the two criteria 
conflict, the payoff dominance should prevail over risk dominance. This is so because the 
criterium of payoff dominance is “focal”. In this case, even if the players are not allowed to 
bargain before the game, there is common knowledge that, if they might, then they would 
settle in the Pareto dominant equilibrium. Thus, they will tacitly coordinate in the payoff 
dominant equilibrium. 
This assertion has been widely debated in the experimental economics. Earlier results with 
coordination games, such as those by COOPER et Al. (1990), Van HUYCK, BATTALIO and BEIL 
(1990, 1991) stressed that Pareto dominant outcomes were often not observed in equilibrium. 
More recent laboratory studies with two-person Stag Hunt such as STRAUB (1995) and 
SCHMIDT et Al. (2003) stress the importance of “risk dominance” considerations in relation to 
those concerning Pareto dominance. In situations where the two criteria single out different 
Nash equilibrium points, SCHMIDT et Al. (2003) say that, even if the payoff dominant strategy 
is selected more often than not, players tend to respond to changes in the risk dominance 
levels, while they seem not be ready to react to variations in payoff dominance levels. 
The importance of the risk dominance criterium derives not only from that it is purely based on 
individual rationality in a situation of strategic uncertainty, but also from the fact that it takes 
into account more information about the players’ payoff functions than the payoff dominance 
criterium. Hence, in 2 2  Stag Hunt games, while the latter criterium is based only upon 
equilibrium payoffs, the former one depends also from payoffs in outcomes that are out of 
equilibrium. Furthermore, while payoff dominance in n-person Stag Hunt games only 
compares individual payoffs, risk dominance is also influenced by the size of the group of 
players. 
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Checking risk dominance in the n-person Stag Hunt educational game 
 
 
Since the game is symmetric, we presuppose that each player holds the same belief  0,1p  
on the likelihood of each opponent selecting the pure strategy   . Then, the expected payoff 
of a player choosing to enrol in college in time period t   is 
   
1 1
1 1
1
11 1
1
1
1
t t t
t t t
t
n n s
n n s xt t t x
S
x k
n n s
p p w
x
 
 
 
   
 
    
 
   (1) 
In (1), tk is the requirement of coordination in the game, which expresses the fact that learning 
takes place in groups. We assume here this requirement follows from the fact that students 
share a fixed learning infrastructure, hence a minimum number of students in necessary for a 
college to break even. We can write this condition as the inequality 
  1 1t t t ty n s c E F      (2) 
Where 
ty  is the number of youngsters that take freely the decision whether to enrol in higher 
education intime period t . 
c  is the cost per student of higher education. 
tE  is the number of higher education institutions in time period t . 
F  is the fixed cost of a higher education institution.  
If we solve inequality (2) in relation to ty , we obtain 
 1 1t t t t t
Fy E n s k
c  
     
  (3) 
Since the cost structure of colleges tends to be invariant, we can set 
 a positive constantF
c
 , and the coordination requirement in time period t  becomes 
 1 1t t t tk E n s      (4) 
The breakeven point of the higher education system varies directly with the number of 
universities and it is negatively influenced by the overall number of college graduates in the 
previous time period. 
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HARSANYI and SELTEN (1988) derive the symmetric expectation each player holds about every 
other participant selecting a pure strategy in a quite intricate way, which is also described in 
CARLSSON and van DAMME (1993-b), van DAMME (2002). Their result is as follows. Let us 
define the “wage premium” of higher education as 
 S U
U
w ww
w
   (5) 
Then HARSANYI and SELTEN (1988) derive the following belief about every other player 
choosing to join college. 
   p w    (6) 
This result is quite intuitive since a high “wage premium” of college education will lead each 
player to believe that the other candidates will chose to join the university with a high 
probability. However, specification (6) is not the unique that is consistent with the “risk 
dominance criterium. By contrast, Guth and Kalkofen (1989)  proposed  
 
1
2
p    (7) 
which is also intuitive, since an individual faced with uncertainty tends to assign the same 
probability to each alternative. 
In what follows, we will follow the former specification of p .  Bearing in mind expressions (4), 
(5) and (6), the expected payoff of playing the pure strategy   in (1) becomes 
   
1 1
1 1
1 1
1
11 1
1
1
1
t t t
t t t
t t t
n n s
n n s xt t t x
S
x E n s
n n s
w w w
x
 
 
 
 
   
  
    
 
     (8) 
Then, the condition that pure strategy   has an higher expected payoff than pure strategy   
is simply 
   
1 1
1 1
1 1
1
11 1
1
1
1
t t t
t t t
t t t
n n s
n n s xt t t x
S U
x E n s
n n s
w w w w
x
 
 
 
 
   
  
     
 
     
Bearing in mind (5), this inequality can be manipulated to give 
   
1 1
1 1
1 1
1
11 1
1
1
1 1
t t t
t t t
t t t
n n s
n n s xt t t x
x E n s
n n s
w w w
x
 
 
 
 
   
  
      
 
      (9) 
 
Let us define  , ,Bin n k p  the cumulative binomial (or Bernoulli) distribution function. 
    
0
, , 1
k
n xx
x
n
Bin n k p p p
x


   
 
   
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Then, inequality (9) can be written simply as 
  1 1 1 11 1, 2, 1t t t t t tBin n n s E n s w w               (10) 
 
Although we have modelled the choice of the pure strategy   as  best reply against a 
subjective belief rather than against the actual equilibrium behaviour of the opponents, it is 
easy to realize that the fulfilment of inequality (10) means that the equilibrium point   is 
indeed the risk dominant equilibrium (see HARSANYI and SELTEN, 1988, lemma 4.17.7). This 
happens because the game is symmetric and  and    are the only strict Nash equilibria in 
this game. 
A direct observation of (10) allows us to state the factors that either ease of make difficult that 
the equilibrium point   arises as “risk dominant” (see HEINEMANN, NAGEL and OCKENFELS, 
2009). 
Proposition 1: The educational game outcome where all candidates decide to enrol in the 
university (equilibrium   ) will become less risky in strategic terms if 
1. The total population in the same time period is high. 
2. The “wage premium” in the same period is high. 
3. The number of universities is low, i.e. the higher education system is concentrated. 
   
 
Applying the k – coordination game to the evolution of higher 
education schooling in Portugal 
 
The time period 1998 -2005 
 
During this time period, the share of population with age 30/34 with a complete university 
degree increased at a high annual growth rate of 8,2%. Resident population within the same 
age interval increased at an average rate of 1.2%, while the “wage premium” of college 
education remained relatively stable and high in comparison to other European countries. 
Some concentration of the college network took place as some private universities ceased to 
exist. The number of students enrolled in private universities per hundred students enrolled in 
the public system fell at the annual rate of -6%.  
We can observe that the causal factors described in Proposition 1 provide a reasonable 
explanation for the evolution of the higher education system during this time period. 
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The time period 2005 – 2018 
 
During this period, the schooling rate of higher education continued to increase at a fast pace, 
with an annual growth rate of 5.0%, and it reached a level of 34% in 2018, not far from the 
39% mean of the EU countries. 
However, it is difficult to rationalize the continuation of higher education growth in connection 
with the causal factors that were listed in Proposition 1. Resident population aged between 
30/34 fell at a -2.7% average annual rate. As we mentioned, the “wage premium” decreased 
almost 23% between 2006 and 2016, the highest fall recorded in OECD countries. The only 
positive factor was the steady decrease in the number of private universities and the 
associated concentration of the university system. In whole, it seems that Proposition 1 fails to 
rationalize the evolution along the time period 2005-2018. 
Hence, we rewrite the n -person Stag Hunt as an “unanimity game”, where a candidate who 
decides to join the university obtains the positive payoff Sw  only if every free youngster makes 
the same choice. This amounts to presuppose that the total number of candidates tn  is just 
equal to the minimum scale tE  for the college system to operate profitably. With this 
change, condition (9) that strategy   is risk dominant for each player becomes 
 
 1 1 1 1t t tn n sw w        (11) 
which is equivalent to 
 
 
1 1
ln 1
1
lnt t t
w
n n s
w 

  


  (12) 
It can be easily checked that the right hand side of inequality (12) is an increasing function of 
w .  As before with the k-coordination game, the strategic riskiness of strategy   is now 
directly associated with the wage premium yielded by higher education. 
However, the left hand side of the inequality (12) tells an utterly different story. For a 
youngster, the degree of safety while joining a college is inversely related with the number of 
youngsters who freely make the same decision, since “unanimity” is easier to achieve the 
smaller the number of concerned agents is. The equilibrium point   becomes more easily 
selected on account of negative demographic trends (i.e. a low value of 1t tn n   ) and by the 
sheer cumulative effect of former spread of higher education (i.e. a high value of 1ts   ). This is 
what seemingly explains the increase in tertiary schooling between 2005 and 2018, when the 
computed value of 1 1t t tn n s   fell sharply at an annual growth rate of -4.2%. 
The results of the unanimity game can be summarized by Proposition 2. 
Proposition 2: In the context of the unanimity game, strategy   is risk dominant for each 
player if 
1. The “wage premium” of higher education is high. 
2. Overall population tends to decrease. 
3. Past level of tertiary schooling is high. 
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Hence, the fast increase of tertiary schooling in Portugal during the period 2005-2018 can be 
rationalized by negative demographic trends and by a circular, cumulative process associated 
with the spread of higher education. A continued development of university education took 
place, although the “wage premium” of college attendance fell sharply during the time period. 
The “unanimity” game requires that the decline in population is matched by a proportional 
decrease in the breakeven point of the higher education system, made feasible through its 
concentration. Such a process seems to have taken place in the time period 2005-2018 
through the closure of private universities. The number of students attending private 
universities per a hundred of students enrolled in the public system fell at the annual rate of -
4% during this period. 
The k-coordination game expressed by inequality (10) and the unanimity game represented by 
condition (12) have a qualitatively different meaning. The former may be viewed as a purely 
non cooperative game, where the players are not allowed to communicate before they move. 
By contrast, as John NASH (1950, 1953) contended, the selection of an equilibrium point in a 
noncooperative “unanimity” game is nothing but a different way of representing a situation 
where the players may discuss explicitly in order to reach an agreement. Hence, the fast 
growth of university education in Portugal between 2005 and 2018, which happened although 
the college “wage premium” fell sharply, mainly reflects a wide social consensus which was 
established through the political system in the country.  
 
Concluding remarks 
 
In this paper, we used HARSANYI and SELTEN (1988)’s risk dominance concept to explain the 
growth in the Portuguese higher education system during two time periods: 1998 -2005 and 
2005-2018. 
During the first time period 1998-2005, the high annual growth rate in tertiary schooling (8.2%) 
can be accounted for within a n – person, k – coordination Stag Hunt game framework. The 
fast growing tertiary schooling rate appears to be the outcome of several factors, namely a 
high and relatively stable “wage premium” of college education, a relatively stable overall 
population and a concentration trend of the higher education system through the closing of 
several private universities. Hence, the progress in university education can be described as a 
noncooperative game, where youngsters and their families take decisions without any kind of 
previous communication. In this process, coordination around an equilibrium point seems to 
stem only from common knowledge of rationality and game rules. 
By contrast, during the most recent time period 2005-2018, the former game seems 
inadequate to rationalize the high 5% annual growth rate of tertiary schooling. Hence, we 
switch to the framework of an “unanimity” game. Although the sharp fall in “wage premium” 
of higher education remained an obstacle to tertiary schooling, the widespread decision to join 
the university by youngsters can be reasonable explained by the decrease in the “unanimity” 
requirement, derived from a shrinking demography and the sheer cumulative effect of past 
spread of college education. 
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We apply here NASH (1950, 1953)’s insight that the selection of an equilibrium point within a 
noncooperative game is but a tool for modelling the outcome of a game where the players 
settle in an agreement by means of previous discussion. Hence, we can describe the rise in 
college education in Portugal in the more recent time period as the outcome of a cooperative 
process, leading to a wide consensus that was established through the operation of the 
political system. 
If the recent progress in university education in Portugal is best regarded as a cooperative 
process, why not to use “payoff dominance” rather than “risk dominance” as the framework 
for examining college schooling trends? We believe that adopting the “risk dominance” 
perspective is still preferable on two grounds. Firstly, the “level of payoff dominance” has 
fallen sharply, although joining the university by all candidates continues to be a Pareto 
optimum. Secondly, the evolution of the university system can be understood only the 
variation in the number of the enrolled individuals is taken in account. Group size 
considerations are included within the “risk dominance” framework, but they are remarkably 
absent from Pareto comparisons between outcomes of higher education development. 
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